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In Suicide, Durkheim found that involvement in religious com-
munities is inversely related to suicide risk. In this article, two ex-
planations for this relationship are examined. One is that religious
networks provide support. The other is that religious communities
prohibit suicide. To examine these hypotheses, individual-level data
on suicide in the Netherlands from 1936 to 1973 are used. Theresults
show that with an increase in the proportion of religious persons in
a municipality, the chances of committing suicide decrease for every
denomination in that municipality, as well as among nonchurch
members. Furthermore, along with the secularization of Dutch so-
ciety, the impact of religious composition on suicide wanes. These
results contradict the network-support mechanism and conﬁrm the
notion that religious communities have a general protective effect
against suicide.
One of the best-known studies in sociology is Durkheim’s Suicide ([1897]
1951), and perhaps the most famous proposition that came out of this
study is that Protestants are more likely to commit suicide than Catholics.
The Protestant-Catholic difference was conﬁrmed both in Durkheim’s
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research and in that of others (e.g., Dublin 1963; Halbwachs [1930] 1978),
and subsequent work designated it as sociology’s “one law” (see Pope and
Danigelis 1981). Durkheim’s classic study received praise for both its
methods and its logical approach (e.g., Selvin 1958). In fact, some have
called Durkheim’s study the most inﬂuential work in sociology (Merton
1967).
Since the 1970s, however, Suicide has been questioned on several
grounds. Theoretically, it has been argued that Durkheim formulated
propositions on macrolevel units, such as groups and regions, and failed
to develop a more informative theory at the microlevel (Thorlindsson and
Bjarnason 1998). Methodologically, it has been argued that Durkheim
formulated propositions at the microlevel, but failed to test them with
individual-level data. Empirically, there is some indication that the dif-
ference between Protestants and Catholics could be attributed to system-
atic undercounting of Catholic suicides (Van Poppel and Day 1996). Pope
(1976) argued that the Protestant-Catholic difference does not even have
an empirical basis in Suicide, and subsequent aggregate-levelstudieshave
continued to raise questions about the validity of the “one law” (Bankston,
Allen, and Cunningham 1983; Faupel, Kowalski, and Starr 1987; Pope
and Danigelis 1981).
A century after Suicide’s publication, severalstudiesevaluatedthestate
of the art; two of these were E ´mile Durkheim: “Le Suicide,” One Hundred
Years Later (Lester 1994) and its European counterpart, “Le suicide”: Un
sie `cle apre `s Durkheim (Borlandi and Cherkaoui 2000). In these and other
metastudies (Stack 2000), the work of Pescosolido (1990, 1994; Pescosolido
and Georgianna 1989) has been acknowledged as a promising answer to
the theoretical critiques of Suicide. Instead of viewing the Protestant-
Catholic difference from either a micro- or a macrolevel, Pescosolido re-
framed the ideas advanced in Suicide within a micro-macro approach,
suggesting that the religious context affects the relationship between re-
ligion and suicide at the individual level. More speciﬁcally, she argued
that a higher level of religious involvement lowers the chance of suicide
because of the community supportpeoplereceivefromco-religionists.This
explanation was tested and conﬁrmed in several studies conducted on
data from the United States (Ellison, Burr, and McGall 1997; Pescosolido
1990).
In this article, after reviewing the criticisms ofSuicidemoreextensively,
we contribute to the ongoing debate over the religion-suicide link in three
ways. First, we suggest a second explanation for the inverse relationship
between religious involvement and suicide risk. We argue that not only
might religious communities provide support, they may also have stronger
prohibitions against suicide than secular communities. Starting from this
idea, we formulate new hypotheses on the effect of individual denomi-Religion and Suicide
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nation and religious context on suicide. Second, we make methodological
progress by using a unique data set, which contains individual-level data
on suicide in the Netherlands between 1936 and 1973 and contextual data
on the religious composition of residential areas. We are thereby able to
avoid the problems associated with aggregate-level data (Breault 1994)
that have been used to examine the religion-suicide link (Bankston et al.
1983; Ellison et al. 1997; Faupel et al. 1987; Pescosolido 1990; Pope and
Danigelis 1981). Third, using individual-level data on suicide in the Neth-
erlands between 1905 and 1910, weexaminetheideathatCatholicsuicides
are systematically underreported and that this is the reason for the ob-
served difference in suicide rates between Catholics and Protestants (Van
Poppel and Day 1996).
DURKHEIM ON SUICIDE: REVIEW AND APPRAISAL
In view of the criticisms of Durkheim’s theory of religion and suicide, it
appears that since the 1970s, the theoretical, methodological, and empir-
ical underpinnings of the religion-suicide link have been seriously ques-
tioned. However, we argue that this was done on the basis of a number
of faulty assumptions, and that Pescosolido (1990, 1994) has provided
fresh theoretical impetus.
The ﬁrst assumption is that the empirical regularity associated with
Protestants being more likely to commit suicide than Catholics is one of
sociology’s “laws” (Bankston et al. 1983; Breault 1986; Faupel et al. 1987;
Pope and Danigelis 1981). In fact, Suicide (Durkheim 1951, p. 208) puts
forward a more general hypothesis, stating that “the more strongly people
are integrated in a religious community, the lower their chances to commit
suicide.” Sociology’s “one law” therefore only applies if Catholics are in-
tegrated within the church community more strongly than Protestants.
Durkheim (1951, p. 161) remarked that the relatively low number of
religious leaders in Protestant countries made this assumption plausible
for the period he was examining. However, later researchers investigating
the religion-suicide link simply assumed Protestants to be always less
integrated than Catholics. Without providing support for this additional
assumption, a ﬁnding that Catholics are more likely to commit suicide
than Protestants need not run counter to Durkheim’s general theory. In
accordance with this more general hypothesis, it was found that in the
Netherlands between 1937 and 1976, Rereformed (orthodox) Protestants
had lower suicide rates than Catholics, who, in turn, had lower suicide
rates than Reformed (liberal) Protestants, with orthodox ProtestantsbeingAmerican Journal of Sociology
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the most frequent churchgoers and liberal Protestants the least likely to
attend church (Ultee, Arts, and Flap 1996).
2
A second faulty assumption is that Durkheim’s theory can be inter-
preted solely in holistic terms. CriticsofDurkheim’s“socialrealism”(Jones
1999) or “collectivism” (O’Neill 1973) argue that Suicide provides a theory
of collective entities but fails to formulate a more informative individual-
level theory. Although Suicide indeed contains macrolevel propositions,
it also provides hypotheses at the individual level. More important, how-
ever, is that the distinction between individuals and society is more or
less artiﬁcial. Besides hypotheses on individuals and hypotheses on so-
cieties, there are also “macro-micro” or “relational” hypotheses on the
inﬂuence of societies on individuals (Huber 1991; Lazarsfeld and Menzel
1961). The Protestant-Catholic pattern lacked exactly this multilevel or
relational interpretation, for it was formulated with absolute properties
of individuals at the microlevel (to be Protestant, to be Catholic) or ab-
solute properties of groups at the macrolevel (Protestant countries, Cath-
olic countries). Durkheim’s more general idea, however, relates the prop-
erties of individuals with those of groups (Catholics and Protestants being
more or less integrated in a religious community). Pescosolido (1990, 1994)
reformulated Suicide in a multilevel approach which we develop here
into two full-ﬂedged competing explanations.
A third problem in the literature is the frequent use of aggregate data.
This is because of the lack of individual-level data on suicidesandpossibly
also because of the macrolevel interpretation of Suicide. Pope and Dan-
igelis(1981) tested theProtestant-Catholicdifferenceinsuicideusingcoun-
tries as their unit of analysis; others have used smaller geographical units,
such as counties in the United States (Bankston et al. 1983; Breault 1986;
Faupel et al. 1987). More recent research conducted in the United States
to examine multilevel effects on the religion-suicide link used counties
(Pescosolido 1990) or standard metropolitan statistical areas (Ellison et
al. 1997) as lower-level units, and larger regions (e.g., the Northeast, the
West, the Midwest, the South) as contextual units. One of the problems
of aggregate-level studies is their neglect of the possibility of contextual
effects. This substantive point is often presented as a methodological one,
2 In the Netherlands, there are two main Protestant (both Calvinist) denominations:
Reformed Protestant (Nederlands Hervormd), which is the main Protestant denomi-
nation in the Netherlands, and Rereformed Protestant Gereformeerd), which refers to
all smaller denominations and churches that seceded from the Reformed Protestant
Church from the year 1834 onward. Reformed Protestants are more liberal than the
Rereformed Protestants.Religion and Suicide
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the so-called “ecological fallacy” (Robinson 1950).
3 If we agree that Durk-
heim’s theory must be modeled at the individual level, aggregate-level
research ﬁndings on the religion-suicide link could be seriously biased.
Several researchers have therefore pleaded for individual-level studies
(Breault 1994; Burr, McCall, and Powell-Griner 1994; Ellison et al. 1997;
Stack 1990; Van Poppel and Day 1996; Wasserman 1984). In addition,
current attempts to build macro-micro linkages in sociology (Huber 1991)
have made the exploitation of data linking the macrolevel to themesolevel
(Ellison et al. 1997; Pescosolido 1990) somewhat off the mark.
A fourth argument against Suicide is the suggestion that Catholics and
Protestants have the same suicide rate, but that Catholics hide suicide as
a cause of death more often than Protestants do (Atkinson 1978; Day
1987; Douglas 1967). Van Poppel and Day (1996) examined this idea,
using a unique individual-level data set on suicides and other causes of
death in the Netherlands from 1905 to 1910. They concluded that the
Protestant-Catholic differential in suicide rates resulted from an under-
counting of Catholic suicides. However, Simpson (1998) pointed to several
methodological omissions in this study. One criticism was that the ratio
of the Protestant-to-Catholic suicide rates and the ratios of rates for other
causes of death, as presented by Van Poppel and Day, did not provide
adequate estimates of suicide undercounting: the calculation of absolute
suicide numbers is to be preferred. Using Van Poppel and Day’s data set,
we applied this method and found that in seven out of ten age-gender
groups, the higher number of suicides among the Protestant groups could
not be attributed to systematic undercounting (app. A). Therefore, the
idea of the undercounting of Catholic suicides, at least for the Netherlands
about a century ago, is not supported.
NEO-DURKHEIMIAN MULTILEVEL EXPLANATIONS OF SUICIDE
Religious Context, Denomination, and Suicide: Community Support or
Community Norms?
In this article, we hold that Durkheim’s Suicide can be augmented in a
fruitful way. Instead of relyingontheProtestant-Catholicdifference,much
is to be gained from a micro-macro approach to the religion-suicide link
3 Durkheim himself was criticized for having committed the ecological fallacy (Van
Poppel and Day 1996). However, a closer inspection of Suicide reveals that Durkheim
(1951, pp. 152–54) tested his individual-level hypothesis on Protestants and Catholics
by disaggregating data (Besnard 2000). Initially he compared the suicide rates of dif-
ferent countries according to their religious composition. He then made the same
comparison between regions within countries and ﬁnally examined individual-level
data for Protestants and Catholics.American Journal of Sociology
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(Pescosolido 1994). From this perspective, the religious context is crucial
for understanding the impact of denomination at the individual level. We
argue that two different explanations can be advanced for the protective
effect of religious communities. The ﬁrst is that religious communities, or
social networks in general, provide social and emotional support to their
members, which prevents people from committing suicide. The other is
that suicide is more strongly prohibited by churches than it is in other
settings, and that the role of religious communities goes beyond that of
protecting their own members. Both ideas can be traced in Suicide, but
their development into multilevel explanations is neo-Durkheimian.
The role of community support on the denomination-suicide link was
most explicitly stated by Pescosolido (1990, 1994; Pescosolido and Geor-
gianna 1989). In an attempt to reframe Durkheim’s ideas from a more
contemporary network perspective, Pescosolido suggested that religious
context affects the relationship between denomination and suicide. She
argued that “having fewer co-religionists or weaker infrastructural base
in a city, rural area, or particular region of the country often makes it
hard to sustain churches and to form a resilient community that provides
integrative protection from suicide” (Pescosolido 1990, p. 340). In addition,
“one potential function of social networks is integration or the ability to
provide social and emotional support” (Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989,
p. 43). According to Pescosolido, therefore, one potential mechanism be-
hind the denomination-suicide link is the support people receive from co-
religionists or, more generally, homogeneous others. More formally stated,
this idea predicts that the more co-religionists there are in an individual’s
direct environment, the more strongly that individual will be involved in
his or her religious community, which will, in turn, provide more support,
lowering the probability of committing suicide. We call this the com-
munity-support mechanism underlying the denomination-suicide link.
The community-support explanation has received ample empiricalcon-
ﬁrmation. Pescosolido (1990) examined aggregate suicide rates in 404
counties in ﬁve regions of the United States in 1970. Her ﬁndings indicate
that the overall protective effect of Catholicism, Judaism, and evangelical
Protestantism tends to be weaker in regions with fewer co-religionists.
For example, she found that in general, a higher proportion of Catholics
in a county lowers the suicide rate in that county; in the South of the
United States, where Catholics are not strongly represented, there is a
positive association between the proportion of Catholics in a county and
suicide rates. Contrary to what might be expected, Pescosolido’s analyses
show that the presence of liberal Protestantism increases the suicide rate
in counties in the Northeast, where Protestantism has traditionally beenReligion and Suicide
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strong.
4 Ellison et al. (1997) examined suicide rates in 296 standard met-
ropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in the United States in 1980. In ac-
cordance with the community-support mechanism, they found that reli-
gious homogeneity in SMSAs, or the extent to which people in a certain
area adhere to a single religion, is negatively associated with suicide rates
in those SMSAs.
A second explanation that brings religious context into denomination
and suicide at the individual level is the notion thatchurches,andreligious
communities more generally, prohibitsuicide.InSuicide,Durkheim(1951,
p. 209) stated that Protestant and Catholic churches are equally strong
in their prohibitions against suicide, but because of their greater involve-
ment in the religious community, Catholics have a lower risk of suicide
than Protestants. Durkheim (1951, p. 219) then mentioned the possibility
of altruistic suicide, itself consisting of three varieties: obligatory,optional,
and acute. Durkheim argued that “when a person kills himself, in all these
cases, it is not because he assumes he has the right to do so but, on the
contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails in this obligation, he is dis-
honored and also punished, usually, by religious sanctions.” Durkheim
(1951, p. 228) then stated that some intermediate groups, such as the army,
allow people to commit suicide in certain circumstances. Accordingly,
Durkheim (1951, pp. 232–37) found that people who are strongly inte-
grated in the army (e.g., ofﬁcers) have higher suicide rates than people
who are less integrated (e.g., soldiers). Taken together, these notions sug-
gest that the impact of the level of integration on suicide riskisconditional
in intermediate groups and depends on the norms that either prohibit or
allow people to commit suicide (see Ultee 1975). If integration in groups
forbidding suicide lower it, integration in groups allowing it increases
suicide.
This suggestion can be generalized into a hypothesis about norm-
regulated behavior in general: the more strongly people are integrated
into a group, the more strongly they comply with any norm of that group
(Stark 1994, p. 82; Ultee et al. 1996, p. 85). This hypothesis has been used
with considerable success to explain voting as conformity to groupopinion
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944), juvenile delinquency as a con-
sequence of having good or bad friends (Hirschi 1969), and individual
religious belief as a result of parental socialization and a nation’s religious
environment (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Here, we examine this hypoth-
esis with respect to suicide and refer to it as the community-norms notion.
4 Pescosolido (1990) remarks that this ﬁnding could be consistent with a social network
idea, in which a certain network structure predisposes its members to commit suicide.
Note that this suggestion comes close to the second mechanism behind the religion-
suicide link.American Journal of Sociology
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The Dutch Religious Setting
The Dutch setting is particularly interesting for studying the relationship
between religion and suicide. First, and most important, individual-level
data on religion and suicide are available for multiple years and multiple
regions. We examined a Dutch population of no fewer than 10 million
persons living in more than 850 municipalities, looking at the yearly oc-
currence of suicide in the period 1936–73. Municipalities in the Nether-
lands are small geographical units that coincide with cities or towns and
their surrounding environment. This multilevel data set has a major ad-
vantage over information in other countries where only aggregate data
on suicide are available.
The Dutch setting is also interesting to study because it is made up of
a large proportion of Catholics and various Protestant denominations.
Findings on religious endogamy in the Netherlands in the period 1938–
83 show that Catholics marry outside their group lessoftenthanReformed
(liberal) Protestants, and religious homogamy tends to be highest among
Rereformed (orthodox) Protestants (Hendrickx, Lammers, and Ultee
1991). Of these three major groups, religious involvement is agreed to be
highest among the Rereformed Protestants, second highest among Cath-
olics, and lowest among Reformed Protestants (Ultee et al. 1996).
Furthermore, the geographic clustering of these three groups differs
considerably across municipalities in the Netherlands. An average mu-
nicipality in the 1936–73 period consists of 43% Catholics, 35% Reformed
Protestants, and 11% Rereformed Protestants (Statistics Netherlands
1930, 1947, 1960, 1971). The southern part of the Netherlands is predom-
inantly Catholic, including municipalities made up almost entirely of
Catholics, whereas the North is mainly Protestant. Because the religious
composition differs between regions, multilevel hypotheses can be tested
more convincingly.
Another reason to study the Dutch scene is that the religious proﬁle of
the Netherlands has changed dramatically over time. In the 1950s, the
Netherlands was highly segmented into religious and secular “pillars”
which were the basis of the social and economic life of their members
(Dekker and Ester 1996). However, since the 1950s, the Netherlands has
experienced a process of rapid secularization, with the result that it is
now one of the most secular nations in the world. For example, in the
1960s about 76% of the population was afﬁliated with a church; in 1980,
this was down to 50% (te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001). Also, the
percentage of people attending church at least once a week dropped from
50% in 1966 to 31% in 1979 (Dekker, De Hart, and Peters 1997). In
addition to the three major religious denominations (Catholics, Reformed
Protestants, and Rereformed Protestants), the Dutch setting is thereforeReligion and Suicide
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made up of a large group of persons who identiﬁed no religious afﬁliation
in the census. An average municipality in the 1936–73 period consists of
about 10% nonchurch members. The suicide pattern of this group pro-
vides a pivotal opportunity to test the community-support mechanism
and the community-norms notion against each another.
Hypotheses on Religion and Suicide in the Netherlands
We used the community-support mechanism and the community-norms
notion to formulate new multilevel hypotheses on the effect of an indi-
vidual’s denomination and the religious composition of residential areas
on suicide in the Netherlands over the period 1936–73. We focus on four
major “religious” groups: Catholics, Reformed Protestants, Rereformed
Protestants, and nonchurch members.
The ﬁrst contextual factor that could affect the denomination-suicide
link is the proportion of church members in a person’s directenvironment.
From the standpoint of the community-support mechanism, it could be
argued that the presence of church members in the community has a
protective impact on church members but an aggravating effect on non-
church members. The community-support explanation assumes that peo-
ple interact more often with persons having the same characteristics,such
as religion, and that they correspondingly receive more support through
homogeneous relationships. To provide a strong, supportive community
to church members, religious groups therefore need to be sufﬁcientlylarge.
In contrast, social networks among nonmembers would tend to be less
cohesive as their numbers in the direct environmentdecrease.Accordingly,
nonmembers would receive less social support in strong religious regions.
Hypothesis 1.—According to the community-support mechanism, an
overall increase in the proportion of church members in a residential area
should diminish the suicide risk of church members and increase the
suicide risk of nonmembers in that area.
In contrast, the community-norms notion predicts that both members
and nonmembers are at lower risk ofcommittingsuicideinhighlyreligious
areas. This is because it assumes that churches strongly prohibit suicide.
To examine whether community norms affect suicide risk, we further
assume that nonchurch members in a residential area will be exposed to
church norms in proportion to the number of church members in that
area. Nonmembers interact with church members at the neighborhood
level, in formal and informal settings, and can therefore be assumed to
have some degree of exposure to the norms of the religious groups in their
environment.
Hypothesis 2.—According to the community-norms notion, the pro-American Journal of Sociology
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portion of church members making up a residential area will be inversely
related to the suicide risk of both members and nonmembers in that area.
We examine a more severe test of the community-support explanation
as well, one that takes differences between denominations into account.
The community-support mechanism assumes that people interact more
often with homogeneous others and, correspondingly, that people receive
more social support from those belonging to the same denomination. For
example, Catholics should gain more support from Catholics than from
Protestants and certainly more than from nonchurch members. The same
line of reasoning applies to other denominations.
Hypothesis 3.—The community-support mechanism suggests that the
chance of suicide among members of a certain denomination is more
strongly diminished if a higher proportion of that same denomination
lives in the same area than if other religious denominations are more
prominent in that area.
We also put the community-norms notion to a more severe test, ex-
amining suicide rates over time. We assume that the trend toward greater
secularization in the Netherlands since the 1950s means that churches
have had less and less inﬂuence on their members. This assumption is
supported by earlier research that showed that the suicide rate increased
in the period 1954–76 in the Netherlands (Ultee et al. 1996). This rise in
the suicide rate was highest among Catholics (from 4.0 in 1954–56 to 9.6
in 1974–76), who experienced the strongest level of secularization. We
assume that the contextual effect of religious composition on the risk of
suicide should also show a decrease over this period.
Hypothesis 4.—The community-norms notion predicts that the inﬂu-
ence of the religious composition of a residential area on the chance to
commit suicide among church members as well as among nonchurch mem-
bers in that area will have decreased after the 1950s.
DATA AND METHODS
To construct our data set, weused all digitallyregistereddataonCatholics,
Rereformed Protestants, Reformed Protestants, and nonchurch members
who committed suicide in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands 1999).
5
This information was taken from the ofﬁcial Dutch registry of causes of
death. Data were available in digital form for several years between 1936
and 1973, namely 1936–39, 1947–52, 1955, 1957, 1962, 1965, 1967, and
1969–73. Unfortunately, we could not use the data after 1973 because
5 Two small categories of persons who committed suicide were omitted from the data
set, namely, suicides where denomination was unknown and for denominations other
than Rereformed Protestant, Catholic, Reformed Protestant, and nonchurch member.Religion and Suicide
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most government administrations stopped recording the religious denom-
ination of suicides after this date. Despite this limitation, a total of 14,744
digitally registered suicides were available for analysis.
As suicide is a rather rare event, parameter estimates would be sensitive
to small random ﬂuctuations of suicide rates if the data from each year
were analyzed separately. Therefore, we grouped all suicides together into
four distinct periods: the prewar period 1936–39 and the postwar periods
1947–52, 1955–67, and 1969–73, during which the inﬂuence of religion
gradually decreased.
The data set contains information on suicides by denomination, name
of municipality, and period. A potential limitation is the lack of individual
controls, such as age and sex. Figures for age, gender, and additional
characteristics combined with denomination for the population at risk are
unavailable at the level of the municipality. Therefore, we could not es-
timate the probability of committing suicide within each combined cat-
egory of municipality, period, denomination, and age, gender, or other
variable. We used census data to estimate population ﬁgures by denom-
ination, municipality, and period (Statistics Netherlands 1930, 1947, 1960,
1971), and we applied linear interpolation to estimate populationnumbers
for the four periods. Before doing this, however, we had to deal with an
additional problem: the number of municipalities changed between 1936
and 1973. In 1936 there were well over 1,100 municipalities, but this fell
to around 870 in 1973 (Statistics Netherlands 1991). As we did not want
our parameter estimates to depend on these changes, we took the situation
in 1973 as given and imposed it on the entire data set. The inhabitants
of municipalities that ceased to exist before 1973 (which were predomi-
nantly small and rural) were thus added to the number of inhabitants of
the (larger) municipalities that took over. This resulted in a longitudinal
data set containing a total population of over 10 million Dutch people
living in 870 different municipalities during the period 1936–73, which
constitutes a unique set of individual and contextual data on suicide,
suitable for a severe test of our hypotheses.
As contextual variables, we used the percentage of church members in
a municipality: Catholics, Rereformed Protestants, and Reformed Prot-
estants. We refrained from calculating the so-called “Herﬁndahl index”
to indicate religious homogeneity (e.g., Ellison et al. 1997) because such
an index is “blind” to the hypotheses at issue. For example, the Herﬁndahl
index is exactly the same for municipalities with 40% nonmembers and
60% Catholics and municipalities with 60% nonmembers and 40% Cath-
olics, whereas we hypothesize that these municipalities would have dif-
ferent contextual effects on the probability of committing suicide.
Because our data consist of two distinct levels, that is, an individual
level and a contextual level, we applied multilevel regression analysesAmerican Journal of Sociology
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(Snijders and Bosker 1999). In these analyses, the probability of com-
mitting suicide is made log-linearly dependent on the individual’s de-
nomination, contextual variables, and their interactions. For practical
reasons, we present the estimated odds and odds ratios instead of the logit
parameters. Because of the nature of our dependent variable, the prob-
ability of not committing suicide is very close to one. The odds ratios for
all contextual variables (measured in percentages) can therefore be read
as the number of times the probability of committing suicide increases
(odds ratio 1 1) or decreases (odds ratio ! 1). The odds for each of the
four denominations can be read as the individual’s probability of com-
mitting suicide. Because this probability is extremely low, it is turned into
a standard suicide rate (no. of suicides per 100,000 individuals). Because
the estimated parameters are based on information from the entire Dutch
population, we do not present conﬁdence intervals or P-values.
RESULTS
To test our four hypotheses, we applied multilevel models in which we
estimated both the effect of the individual’s denomination and the con-
textual effect of the percentage of church members in that individual’s
municipality. Because this contextual effect was expected to differ across
denominations, we included cross-level interactions between denomina-
tion and the percentage of church members. We made separate estimates
for each of the four periods and for the overall period 1936–73. The results
are shown in table 1.
The upper part of table 1 presents the estimated suicide rate for each
of the four denominations within an average municipality (i.e., where
90.6% of the inhabitants are church members). For example, in such a
municipality, the suicide rate among Catholics was 5.2 in the 1936–73
period. The lower part of table 1 shows the estimated contextual effects
for each of the four denominations. These effects were parameterized to
express the relative change in the suicide rate that would occur if the
percentage of church members within the municipality changed by 10
percentage points. For instance, if Catholics lived in a municipality that
consisted of 80.6% church members (i.e., 10 percentage points below av-
erage), the estimated suicide rate in the 1936–73 period would be
. Note that the suicide rates at the individual level in the 5.20/0.86 p 6.04
three religious groups studied vary indirectly with the degree of religious
involvement. In an average municipality over the period 1936–73, we
predict that the lowest suicide rate will be among Rereformed (orthodox)
Protestants (3.8), and the highest among Reformed (liberal) Protestants
(8.8), while Catholics fall in between at 5.2. The fact that nonmembersReligion and Suicide
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TABLE 1
Estimated Suicide Rates among Denominations (Individual Level) and the
Effect of Changing Percentages of Church Members (Contextual Level) in the
Netherlands, 1936–73
1936–73 1936–39 1947–52 1955–67 1969–73
Individual level:
Denomination:* ....................
Rereformed Protestants ......... 3.8 4.9 3.2 3.8 3.9
Reformed Protestants ........... 8.8 12.2 7.7 8.1 7.7
Catholics ......................... 5.2 5.2 4.2 4.8 6.8
Nonchurch members ........... 5.9 7.2 5.8 6.6 4.7
Contextual level (municipalities):
Effect of % church members on
the suicide rates of:
†
Rereformed Protestants ......... .89 .90 .83 .88 .91
Reformed Protestants ........... .85 .80 .76 .84 .88
Catholics ......................... .86 .84 .77 .84 .94
Nonchurch members ........... .90 1.09 .91 .95 .84
* Effects for each denomination denote the estimated suicide rate per 100,000 in an average munic-
ipality (i.e., with 90.6% church members).
† The effect of the percentage church members denotes the no. of times the estimated suicide rate
within each denomination decreases (odds ratio ! 1) or increases (odds ratio 1 1) with every10-percentage-
point increase of the percentage church members in a municipality.
rank only second highest (5.9) could be because of the fact that on average,
they are younger than Reformed Protestants.
Hypothesis 1, derived from the community-support mechanism, states
that the higher the percentage of church members in a municipality, the
lower the probability of church members committing suicide, but the
higher the probability for nonchurch members. Alternatively, the com-
munity-norms notion implies that the higher the percentage of church
members in a municipality, the lower the probabilityofcommittingsuicide
for both church members and nonmembers (hypothesis 2). According to
the lower part of table 1, all effects are below one, indicating that all
suicide rates decrease as the percentage of church members in the com-
munity increases, with only one exception (for nonmembers, the effect
amounts to 1.09 in the 1936–39 period). These ﬁndings contradict the
community-support mechanism, which suggests that in strong religious
communities, church members have strong social networks that provide
social and emotional support, whereas nonchurch members are more ex-
cluded from community life and would not have this protective network.
Instead, our analyses conﬁrm the community-norms notion, arguing that
in strong religious communities, suicide is strongly prohibited for all mem-
bers of the community. Through interactions within neighborhoods,socialAmerican Journal of Sociology
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circles, and work settings, this norm affects even the behavior of those
not involved in churches.
Another, more severe, test of the community-support mechanism is to
estimate the contextual inﬂuence of each of the denominations instead of
the contextual inﬂuence of church membership in general. According to
community-support hypothesis 3, the probability of committing suicide
would be most strongly inﬂuenced by the contextual effect of the denom-
ination to which the individual belongs. According to community-norms
hypothesis 2, denomination makes no difference: the contextual inﬂuence
of all denominations should be roughly equal because suicide is forbidden
in all religious communities. We therefore applied a multilevel analysis
that measured the contextual effect of a religious community using the
percentages of Reformed Protestants, Rereformed Protestants, and Cath-
olics in the community. Results are shown in table 2.
The lower part of table 2 shows that for all three religious denomi-
nations, the contextual effects of Rereformed Protestants, Reformed Prot-
estants, and Catholics on suicide rates are all below 1.00. The third hy-
pothesis predicts that this contextual effect is strongest (i.e., closest tozero)
where the individual’s denomination matches the denominationprevalent
at the contextual level. For instance, among Rereformed Protestants, the
contextual effect of Rereformed Protestants should be stronger than the
contextual effects of Reformed Protestants and Catholics. However, these
predictions run counter to almost every ﬁnding in table 2, except in the
period 1947–52, when the contextual effect of Rereformed Protestants
(0.82) among Rereformed Protestants was indeed stronger than the con-
textual effect of Reformed Protestants (0.90) and Catholics (0.90). Thus,
our ﬁndings do not conﬁrm hypothesis 3 and again favor hypothesis 2.
This suggests that the presence of a strong religious community that pro-
hibits suicide is more important in reducing suicide rates than having co-
religionists who supposedly provide social and emotional support.
We also tested the community-norms notion in a more rigorous way.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the contextual effects shown in table 2 should
decrease from the period 1947–52 onward, as the inﬂuence of religion
waned as part of broad secularization in the Netherlands. As table 2
shows, in most cases, the effects did indeed decrease. For example, the
contextual effect of Catholics among Rereformed Protestants was at its
highest (0.79) in 1947–52 and decreased to none (1.00) in 1969–73. Ex-
ceptions to this rule are the increasing contextual effects of Catholics and
Reformed Protestants among nonchurch members. All in all, we think
there is enough empirical evidence to corroborate hypothesis 4. This sug-
gests that by prohibiting suicide, religious communities have a protective
effect, but because of lower religious participation over time, these com-
munity norms have correspondingly lost much of their impact.Religion and Suicide
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TABLE 2
Estimated Suicide Rates among Denominations (Individual Level) and the
Effect of Changing Percentages of Denominations (Contextual Level) in the
Netherlands, 1936–73
1936–73 1936–39 1947–52 1955–67 1969–73
Individual level:
Denomination:* .........................
Rereformed Protestants .............. 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.1 4.0
Reformed Protestants ................ 12.0 20.8 13.6 10.9 8.6
Catholics .............................. 6.5 7.9 7.3 6.3 6.8
Nonchurch members ................. 5.5 7.5 4.8 6.3 4.5
Contextual level (municipalities):
Effect of % Rereformed Protestants
on the suicide rates of:
†
Rereformed Protestants .............. .89 .87 .82 .92 .93
Reformed Protestants ................ .81 .78 .74 .83 .90
Catholics .............................. .89 .89 .79 .76 1.00
Nonchurch members ................. 1.08 1.29 1.22 1.05 .98
Effect of % Reformed Protestants on
the suicide rates of:
†
Rereformed Protestants .............. .90 .93 .90 .86 .96
Reformed Protestants ................ .88 .85 .82 .87 .89
Catholics .............................. .88 .90 .91 .84 .94
Nonchurch members ................. .89 1.01 .90 .92 .83
Effect of % Catholics on the suicide
rates of:
† .94
Rereformed Protestants .............. .87 .79 .90 .83 .90
Reformed Protestants ................ .87 .85 .82 .87 .95
Catholics .............................. .88 .88 .84 .84 .84
Nonchurch members ................. .89 1.09 .87 .93
* Effects for each denomination denote the estimated suicide rates in an average municipality (i.e.,
with 34.5% Reformed, 10.8% Rereformed, and 43.1% Catholic).
† The effect of % Rereformed Protestants, % Reformed Protestants, and % Catholic denotes the no.
of times the suicide rate within each denomination decreases (odds ratio ! 1) or increases (odds ratio 1
1) with every 10-percentage-point increase of the religious group’s percentage in a municipality.
CONCLUSIONS
This article addressed theoretical, methodological, and empirical criti-
cisms of the Durkheimian link between religion and suicide. We have
shown that much of this criticism ismisplacedandthattheideasadvanced
in Suicide can be elaborated in a proﬁtable way.
To begin, this link should not be restricted to the differences between
Protestant and Catholic suicide rates, because Suicide provides a more
general hypothesis that speciﬁes conditions under which this presumed
regularity does or does not occur. This hypothesis states that “the more
strongly people are integrated in religious communities, the lower their
chances to commit suicide.” It also implies predictions about differencesAmerican Journal of Sociology
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between liberal and conservative Protestants, and between persons with
a certain denomination and those without a religion.
Furthermore, Suicide suggests two mechanisms behind this hypothesis.
First, religious communities, and social networks more generally, provide
social and emotional support, which restrain suicidal tendencies. We refer
to this as the community-support mechanism. Second, religious commu-
nities prohibit suicide, implying that greater involvement in religious life
is inversely related to suicide risk. We call this the community-norms
notion.
Because both hypotheses specify contextual effects, we applied multi-
level techniques to individual-level data on suicide and contextual-level
data on the religious composition of municipalities in the Netherlands
over the period 1936–73. In so doing, we improved on studies of suicide
that have contained information on either the individual or the contextual
level, but not on both. This approach also helped avoid the risk of eco-
logical fallacies, so frequently associated with Suicide and subsequent
research.
Our ﬁndings support the community-norms notion and question the
community-support mechanism: the proportion of religious members in
a municipality is inversely related to the chance of suicide for both church
members and nonchurch members. Furthermore, we found that the prob-
ability of members of a denomination committing suicide is not inﬂuenced
more strongly by the presence of that denomination (or other denomi-
nations) in the community. For example, Catholics in an overwhelmingly
Catholic municipality are not at a lower risk of committing suicide than
Catholics in a predominantly Protestant municipality. Instead, our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that religious communities exert an overall protective effect
on all the members of a community, irrespective of their individual de-
nomination, and including nonchurch members. Thus, it is not social
support from homogeneous others that prevents people from suicide, but
rather a shared religious norm prohibiting suicide, which extends to those
who are not afﬁliated with any denomination. We assumed that this norm
had become less widespread in the Netherlands after World War II. Our
analyses indeed showed a diminishing impact of religious context on su-
icide over time, thereby reinforcing the idea of community norms.
In sum, the multilevel neo-Durkheimian approach advanced in this
article is promising if Durkheim’s theory is interpreted in a general way,
specifying the relationship between individuals and social settings, and if
it is tested with a multilevel design, containing information on both levels.
In understanding the protective effect of religious communities, our anal-
yses are more in favor of a community-norms explanation than a com-
munity-support explanation, at least for the Netherlands between 1936
and 1973.Religion and Suicide
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DISCUSSION
How strong is our evidence in favor of the community-norms notion as
opposed to the social-support argument? Here, we discuss our ﬁndings
for the Netherlands and previous U.S. studies in terms of data quality
and suggest possible theoretical elaborations and implications.
This study used individual-level data on suicide, whereas studies con-
ducted in the United States have relied on aggregate statistics. We argue
that aggregate studies carry the risk of ecological fallacies and do not
examine micro-macro effects. Statistical problems arise in multilevelstud-
ies, too. When using aggregate data at the macro- (e.g., regional) and
mesolevels (e.g., county), the number of cases at the highest (contextual)
level is quite small. Ellison et al. (1997) and Pescosolido (1990) used four
or ﬁve regions as contextual cases, which does not provide a strong test
of contextual effects (Lieberson 1991). Furthermore, predictors in aggre-
gate analyses (such as the divorce rate and percentage of church members)
are often strongly correlated, making the results unstable. These argu-
ments do not apply to population statistics for individuals and contexts;
hence, research using such data is to be encouraged. European data,
particularly prewar German statistics, provide a fruitful source.
However, a potential drawback of population statisticsonsuicidewhich
does not apply to aggregate studies is the difﬁculty of obtaining individual
controls. Although the records of people who committed suicide contain
information on individual characteristics (e.g., marital status, age, sex),
the statistics for the population at risk are often limited. It is possible that
the variables for religious context in our analysis are associated with the
composition of individual factors that affect suicide risk, and omitting
relevant controls at the individual level could bias the interpretation of
these effects (Blalock 1984; Hauser 1969).
We believe, however, that the limitations of our data set are not serious.
We have no reason to suspect that religious context is strongly associated
with possibly disturbing individual-levelfactors.Indeed,aggregatestudies
on the impact of religion on suicide in the United States show similar
results for models with and without controls. Pescosolido and Georgianna
(1989) include aggregated controls for income, education, sex, age, mi-
gration, divorce, and population density. They remark that the inclusion
of these controls “did not change the inﬂuence of religion coefﬁcients”
(Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989, p. 37). Applying such controls would
probably not make much of a difference in our study, either.
Moreover, the inclusion of individual controls sometimes obscures mat-
ters of causality. One factor for which we did not control was marital
status. It is well known that divorced persons have a higher suicide rate
than married people (Stack 1990). However, religious communities notAmerican Journal of Sociology
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only prohibit suicide, but they also discourage divorce more strongly than
secular communities (Bainbridge 1989). Including controls for marital
status could therefore turn a signiﬁcant effect of religion on suicide into
an insigniﬁcant direct effect plus an (in)signiﬁcant indirect effect, thereby
concealing the total effect of religion. Burr et al. (1994) showed that in
the United States, religion has a direct effect on suicide, and that it has
indirect effects mediated through divorce. The situation in the Nether-
lands is probably not very different.
On a theoretical level, the evidence we present in favor of the com-
munity-norms notion could be questioned. We haveassumedthatreligious
communities prohibit suicide more strongly than secular communities,
but we have not actually measured this. Pescosolido and Georgianna
(1989) contacted representatives of 27 religious bodies and found that only
two had an ofﬁcial position on suicide. Hence, they dismissed the com-
munity-norms argument.
However, Stark and Bainbridge (1997) present ﬁgures on attitudes to-
ward suicide from the 1989, 1990, and 1991 U.S. General Social Surveys.
6
They show that 8% of conservative Protestants maintain that a person
has the right to end his or her own life; this belief is also held by 8% of
Catholics, 16% of liberal Protestants, and 37% of nonchurch members.
In the Netherlands, in the period 1979–2000, 12% of conservative Prot-
estants maintained that people should have the right to end their own
life, as did 17% of Catholics, 17% of liberal Protestants, and 38% of
nonchurch members.
7
These ﬁgures show, ﬁrst, that in both countries, religious communities
clearly prohibit suicide more strongly than secular communities. Second,
they indicate that religious communities in the United States (especially
conservative Protestants and Catholics) prohibit suicide more strongly
than do those communities in the Netherlands, which is consistent with
the stronger position of religion in the United States than in the Neth-
erlands (Campbell and Curtis 1994). This provides an explanation for our
ﬁnding that religious communities in the Netherlands do not have the
normative constraint on suicide they once had, while religious commu-
nities continue to play a role in the United States. Finally, it seems that
6 The original question was stated as follows: “A person has the right to end their own
life if the person is tired of living and ready to die?” Respondents could choose between
(1) yes, (2) no, and (3) don’t know. The last category was omitted to compute
percentages.
7 This information is from Eisinga et al. (1992, 1999, 2002). The survey question (trans-
lated from Dutch) was “Do you think that people should have the right to end their
own life if they want to, or do you think this should be prevented?” Respondents could
choose among three response categories: (1) “They should have the right,” (2) “Depends
on circumstances,” and (3) “This should be prevented.”Religion and Suicide
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in examining the role of the norms of religious communities on suicide,
it is important to consider the religiosity of the entire nation. As an elab-
oration of the community-norms notion, we suggest that the norms of
religious communities are reinforced by the wider social and institutional
context. Here, we are pointing toward a more general research agenda
for the neo-Durkheimian multilevel approach. In this perspective, suicide
and other rule-guided forms of behavior (such as crime and divorce) are
explained in terms ofnormsofcommunitiesandthebroadersocialcontext.
How strong is our evidence against the social-support mechanism? We
suggest several explanations and points of elaboration for the contradic-
tions around this idea and our research ﬁndings. First of all, it might be
questioned whether communities always provide positive social support.
Just as community norms do not always prohibit suicide, religious com-
munities, or social networks more generally, might not always provide
positive support. The literature contains several instances of negative or
“sour” social capital. Despite the positive effect of religion on well-being
and health in general (Ellison et al. 2001), some studies have indicated
that religion can have a negative impact. For the United States, it was
found that the likelihood of a major depression was three times greater
among Pentecostals than among persons without a religious afﬁliation
(Meador et al. 1992). In addition, De Graaf and Flap (1988) showed that
people who used nonpersonal methods to ﬁnd a job obtained better jobs
than people who used informal contacts. Moerbeek and Need (2003)
showed that people could have “foes” in the workplace, who, in turn,
reduced their labor-market opportunities. Finally, instrumental support
at work can have negative effects on well-being (Deelstra et al. 2003).
Thus, there is ample evidence for negative social support.
Second, one could ask to whom religious communities provide support.
For the United States, it may be that religious communities are “selﬁshly
protective,” that they protect only their own local group (Friedman and
McGarvie 2003). In contrast, it could be that in the Netherlands, higher
levels of community religiosity are associated with more support for all
members of the community, including members of other religions or in-
dividuals who belong to no religious group. This may account for our
ﬁnding that in the Netherlands, religious communities, irrespective of
denomination, lower the suicide rate, while studies in the United States
have found that only the presence of one’s own group lowers suicide risk.
However, this explanation is less plausible in view of the strong religious
segregation in Dutch society in the period we examined (Dekker and Ester
1996). While the norms of the religious community inﬂuence all members
of a community, support was clearly restricted to one’s own group.
A third, and probably more promising, way of elaborating the social-
support argument is to consider the strength of support that religiousAmerican Journal of Sociology
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communities provide. Just as community norms could be absent or weak,
community support could be substituted by other forms of support. Apart
from being inﬂuenced by community ties, support for individuals and the
resources available to them depend upon market exchange, institutional
distribution, and coercive appropriation (Wellman and Wortley1990).The
extent to which alternatives are available therefore affects the amount of
support provided by religious communities.
The role of the state as a source of social support is relevant in this
respect. After World War II, the Dutch state provided extensive welfare
facilities, while in the United States, expenditures on welfare were con-
siderably lower (Esping-Andersen 1990). Perhaps, then, the Netherlands
is a country where religious communities, and social networks more gen-
erally, provide less social support than do those in the United States, since
more support is provided by the state of the Netherlands than by the
government of the United States. Differences between these societies in
the role of the state might therefore provide an alternative explanation
for the fact that the impact of religious communities on suicide is dimin-
ishing in Dutch society, while it remains important in the U.S. setting.
Following our suggestion about community norms being inﬂuenced by
the wider social context, we argue that the amount of social support
provided by the community declines in relation to the support provided
by the broader social setting. The literature shows some evidence for this
suggestion. De Graaf and Flap (1988) showed that in the United States,
there is more use of informal sources to ﬁnd a job than there is in the
Netherlands and West Germany. In addition, it was found that social
capital—as measured in terms of contacts with family and friends—is
lower in social-democratic welfare regimes and in societies with large
social expenditures (Scheepers, te Grotenhuis, and Gelissen 2002). This
suggests another potentially fruitful research agenda for the neo-
Durkheimian multilevel approach, in which the support provided by so-
cial networks and by other actors (such as the state) are considered
simultaneously.
APPENDIX A
Reliability of Ofﬁcial Suicide Statistics
Van Poppel and Day (1996) maintained that Catholics hide suicides more
often than Protestants. If this is true, these hidden suicides should be
buried in other death classiﬁcations. Therefore, one should calculate ab-
solute numbers, as was done by Phillips (1974, 1979), instead of ratios,
as was done by Van Poppel and Day. We reanalyzed the data set (Statistics
Netherlands 1907) used by Van Poppel and Day and present the resultsReligion and Suicide
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in table A1. Table A1 presents the number of deceased persons by gender,
age, religion, and cause of death. Under each cause of death, the observed
number of Protestant deaths is presented ﬁrst, followed by the observed
number of Catholicdeaths, thentheexpectednumberofCatholicdeaths—
assuming that Catholics would have the same death rate as Protestants—
and, ﬁnally, the difference between observed and expected Catholic
deaths.
For example, from 1905 to 1910, Statistics Netherlands counted 155
male Protestant suicides in the group between 20 and 29 years of age. At
that time, this would give a suicide rate (no. of suicides per 100,000
individuals) of 10.12 within that speciﬁc group. If Catholics committed
suicide at the same rate as Protestants in this category, the expected num-
ber of Catholic suicides would be 94. Table A1 shows that Statistics
Netherlands recorded 52 suicides, leaving 42 cases that could have been
incorrectly classiﬁed under other causes. However, one can see that only
“sudden death” lists more Catholics than expected (4). If all causes of
death are considered, it appears that among males 20–29 years old, 68
fewer Catholics than expected died.
If these comparisons are made for females and other age groups as
well, it turnsoutthat youngeragegroupsshownoCatholicundercounting,
but some older age groups do. It appears that in seven out of the ten age-
gender groups, the lower rate of suicide among Catholics cannot be at-
tributed to systematic undercounting. We conclude that some under-
counting of Catholic suicides might exist (and did at the beginning of the
19th century in the Netherlands), but it is restricted to older age groups.
We see no reason to believe that this undercounting accounts for the
Protestant-Catholic differential.8
1
8
TABLE A1
Religion and Cause of Death by Age and Gender in the Netherlands, 1905–10: Difference between Observed (O) and Expected
(E) Number of Deceased Persons
Age Group
20–29 30–39 40–49 50–64 65–79
Cause of Death Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
All suicides:
Protestant (O) .................... 155 60 154 54 238 80 429 128 241 67
Catholic (O) ...................... 52 16 52 10 69 20 117 32 63 13
Catholic (E) ...................... 94 35 94 32 142 46 260 75 150 39
Catholic (O–E) ................... 42 19 42 22 73 26 143 43 87 26
Real accidents:*
Protestant (O) .................... 12 19 20 15 17 31 30 32 23 41
Catholic (O) ...................... 7 10 7 5 3 10 11 17 10 27
Catholic (E) ...................... 7 11 12 9 10 18 18 19 14 24
Catholic (O–E) ................... 0 1 5 4 7 8 7 2 43
Suspected accidents:
†
Protestant (O) .................... 592 138 462 91 391 104 590 189 448 213
Catholic (O) ...................... 332 55 253 38 236 27 343 72 210 1008
1
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Catholic (E) ...................... 358 80 282 53 233 60 358 111 278 125
Catholic (O–E) ................... 26 25 29 15 3 33 15 39 68 25
Sudden deaths:
Protestant (O) .................... 13 15 17 21 45 32 128 96 173 154
Catholic (O) ...................... 12 15 19 22 41 44 103 87 164 130
Catholic (E) ...................... 8 9 10 12 27 18 78 56 107 90
Catholic (O–E) ................... 4 6 9 10 14 26 25 31 57 40
Ill-deﬁned or unspeciﬁed cause of
death:
Protestant (O) .................... 200 181 214 259 361 320 930 836 1,655 1,675
Catholic (O) ...................... 117 114 131 166 210 214 640 620 1,338 1,059
Catholic (E) ...................... 121 105 131 152 216 184 563 489 1,027 979
Catholic (O–E) ................... 49 01 4 6 30 77 131 311 80
Deaths from all causes:
Protestant (O) .................... 972 413 867 440 1,132 567 2,107 1,281 2,540 2,150
Catholic (O) ...................... 520 210 462 241 559 315 1,214 828 1,785 1,329
Catholic (E) ...................... 588 240 530 258 629 326 1,277 750 1,576 1,257
Catholic (O–E) ................... 68 30 68 17 70 11 63 78 209 72
* Accidental deaths that can reasonably be presumed to contain no “hidden” suicides.
† Accidental deaths that can reasonably be presumed to contain “hidden” suicides.American Journal of Sociology
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